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This paper analyses the worldwide popular recorded music industry and examines how
product, firm and industry features result in key resources coagulating around the two firm
types; the major and independent. We argue that these firm specific resources are comple-
mentary and participating firms would benefit from their union. However though comple-
mentary, they are inimical and close association risks damaging their value. Collaboration
between the two firm types that hold these resources therefore needs to be designed not
along traditional concerns of protection from opportunism, or the requirement to control key
resources. Instead competitive advantage may be gained by designing and managing
structural relationships that protect each partner’s resource set from the hostile elements of
the others; a contamination rather than an appropriation focus.
Introduction
T his paper examines boundary decisionstaken by firms operating in the popular
recorded music industry, and focuses on what
can be regarded as one of the key drivers of the
industry and source of competitive advantage;
the identification and management of musical
talent (Belinfante & Johnson, 1982). An iden-
tification and discussion of product charac-
teristics, market idiosyncrasies, and firm
typologies results in the paper’s overall prop-
osition; that the resources and capabilities
required to identify, attract and manage emerg-
ing talent cannot operate within the same
business unit boundaries as those resources
and capabilities required to effectively dis-
tribute and market the resulting product. The
set of strategic resources and capabilities re-
quired to build sustainable competitive ad-
vantage therefore cannot co-exist within the
boundaries of one firm. The resulting inter-
organisational structures can thus be seen not
just as a means of accessing valuable and
complementary resources and capabilities of
another firm but also to shield the associating
firms from exposure to inimical practices and
culture of their partner. We therefore con-
clude that in the popular recorded music
industry it is not just issues stemming from
the cost of opportunistic partner behaviour, or
social congruity that inform inter-firm struc-
tural decisions, but contamination concerns as
well.
The music industry is dominated by a group
of global firms commonly referred to as the
‘majors’. These are the largest (by number of
artists and soundcarrier market share) record
companies in the world. The group currently
consists of, Universal Music Group, (formed
from a 1998 merger of MCA/Universal and
PolyGram, previously majors in their own
right), Sony Music Entertainment (SME);
Bertelsmann Music Group Entertainment
(BMGE); Warner Music Group (WMG) and
EMI. These companies have a global market
share of around 80%. The remaining share
is taken up by a large number of smaller,
relatively short-lived and highly specialised
companies known as the ‘independents’.
Music Business International (1999), producer
of the industry’s year book, defines indepen-
dents as ‘companies who derive most or all of
their profits via the direct exploitation of
music copyrights . . . whose shares are at least
50% owned separately from the multinational
music majors and who were not originally
bankrolled by any of the majors.’ Such a
definition groups together one or two-man
outfits with large organisations (sometimes
known as ‘mini-majors’) such as Zomba,
which has a wide range of artists, estimated
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turnover of $575m in 1998 and a global
distribution network. Since the 1950s, when
independent music labels started to take
advantage of the majors’ reluctance to carry
rock and roll music (Gillett, 1996), the
independents and the majors have had an
inter-worked history.
Throughout this highly interconnected
history the relationships between major and
independent firms have encompassed a wide
range of structural relationships from full
ownership, to distribution and licensing con-
tracts lasting a few years or covering a few
albums. Some writers (Peterson & Berger,
1975) have pointed to the frequent acquisition
of independents by majors and the differing
organisational cultures as evidence of hostile
relationships between these two ideal-types,
with each form going through cyclical periods
of fortune and power at the expense of the
other. However in recent years, industry
commentators (Negus, 1992; Frith, 1990) have
identified a more co-operative model, similar
to the conceptualisation of co-opetition ad-
vanced by Brandenburger & Nalebuff (1996).
Lopes (1992) has found support for the
hypothesis that the oligopolistic conditions
in the music industry (Belinfante & Johnson,
1982) have not produced the homogenisation
of product assumed to accompany such
control (Peterson & Berger, 1975) the identi-
fied diversity and innovation being due to
a more open system of co-operation with
independent record companies.
We propose that this current and historical
pattern of close inter-organisational relation-
ships between majors and independents
reflects the industry’s market and product
idiosyncrasies (Hagedoorn & Sadowski, 1999)
and the simultaneously complementary and
inimical nature of the firms’ differing re-
sources and capabilities (Dyer & Singh, 1998).
We begin by identifying the industry, firm
and product idiosyncrasies that underpin the
logic of collaboration and then discuss how
the attempt to unify runs the risk of reducing
the value, and impairing the operation, of the
creative resources involved.
Industry and product features that
encourage major/independent
collaboration
One characteristic of the music industry is the
oversupply of potential product creators
(Throsby, 1994; Kretschmer, Klimis & Choi,
1999; Hirsch, 1972). The raw material for the
creative product, artistic endeavour, is subject
to relatively low creation barriers, e.g. a
guitar, paper, and enjoys a degree of intrinsic
utility. This results in a large amount of
potential product relative to the number
actually marketed. Music research has so far
been largely written on the victors (those
artists who become successful), so figures on
number of potential artists are unavailable.
However Finnegan (1989) estimated there
were around 100 practising bands in a UK
city of around 100,000, and Negus (1992) cites
Cohen (1991) as finding a similar proportion
for the city of Liverpool in 1991.
This oversupply contributes to another
noticeable feature of firms involved in cul-
tural environments, that of uncertainty ‘at
their input and output boundaries’ (Hirsch,
1972:639). As definitions of cultural goods
commonly refer to their ‘aesthetic, rather than
clearly utilitarian purpose’ (Hirsch, 1972:639)
the evaluation of both the producers (artists)
and their product relies upon matching
already imperfect information on the talent
of an artist (Strobl & Tucker, 2000) against
abstract and fluid criteria (Hutter, 1996). It is
worth mentioning briefly at this point that,
unlike ‘pop’ genres, the classical music
market enjoys a relatively more stable pre-
dictive framework. Classical music record-
ings can be measured against more definable
criteria, such as conductor or orchestra skill
and reputation, popularity of the composer,
and sound recording quality. Expert judge-
ment on the quality of a recording is shared
to a large degree by its market. However,
classical music comprises a relatively small
proportion of recorded music sales (currently
about 5% in Europe and the USA).
The oversupply of potential acts and
uncertainty over their quality makes predict-
ing which act are likely to ‘take off’ a task of
extreme uncertainty. Perhaps the most notable
effect of these factors is that it makes the ability
to identify and capture (i.e. sign) tomorrow’s
mainstream act an industry success factor that
cannot easily be substituted by a heavily
funded large-net strategy. The challenge is
summed up by one industry executive as
‘What’s weird today could be mainstream
tomorrow’ (Independent, 27th October 1991).
Musical styles such as rock ‘n’ roll, punk, rap,
and grunge have all had their origins in the
rejection of the prevailing mainstream music.
While large multinationals by virtue of their
size, culture and reputation are to some extent
distanced from grassroot musical develop-
ments, there are some indications that in-
dependents are better equipped to spot the
next trend. These smaller record labels have
greater artistic flexibility, closer ties to the
non-mainstream music scene, and through
their social similarities with the artists can
inspire the trust (Zucker, 1986) that improves
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their ability to ‘win’ the signature of ‘up and
coming’ artist(s). Although we are not aware
of any published research which correlates
the type of firm and the successful identifica-
tion of new musical styles and artists, casual
empiricism can comfortably identify exam-
ples of independent-discovered artists that
have enjoyed notable success; Elvis Presley
(Sun Records) Nirvana (Sub Pop Records),
Oasis (Creation Records) and Britney Spears
(Jive Records).
If one accepts that the identification of new
talent is a ‘critical key to success in the
recorded music industry’ (Belinfante & John-
son, 1982:12) it is clear that the majors are
critically dependent upon the independents.
Another defining characteristic of the pop-
ular music industry, the nature of consumer
demand, provides the independent with a
rationale for collaboration with a major.
Demand patterns in the music industry,
driven by dynamic consumer tastes for
product with aesthetic rather than functional
value, are highly variable and difficult to
predict. This uncertainty of demand inherent
in such cultural product (Caves, 2000) is
exacerbated by the herding behaviour of
individual consumers (Kirman, 1993) that
results in a high concentration of sales among
relatively few artists (Cox, Felton & Chung,
1995).
Referred to as the ‘superstar phenomenon’
(Rosen, 1981; Hamlen, 1991) attempts have
been made to explain how small differences
in talent produce massive differentials in
earnings, or even how no difference in talent
(Adler, 1985) can produce high concentra-
tions. The phenomenon of self-enforcing
feedback loops (Arthur, 1996), decreased
consumption costs (Adler, 1985), ‘social con-
tagion’ (Kretschmer et al., 1999), or as Becker
(1991:1110) puts it, buyer behaviour, ‘depends
positively on the aggregate quantity de-
manded of the good’. All refer to the utility
derived from purchasing products that have
been purchased by others, a feature of many
cultural markets, but particularly visible in
popular music. The dynamic thus experi-
enced by a few artists is one of increasing
returns. Although it does not result in the
lock-ins which create monopolies as in
Arthur’s technology-based model or hyper-
competition (D’Aveni, 1995), presumably
because of the ephemerality of the music
product, nevertheless there are large sales
differentials between products that catch
the wind and those that do not (Ormerod,
1998).
Due to this demand phenomenon, estab-
lishing initial interest and early sales to
achieve the required momentum is key
(Strobl & Tucker, 2000). Firms can accord-
ingly devote substantial resources to the
promotion of new product, which, while
increasing the chances of catching the sales
wind, exposes them to risk. Strauss Zelnick,
ex-President/CEO of BMGE, has described
how his company could spend around $1m
on a new act, yet of the 60,000 new records
released annually by the record industry only
1% sell more than one million, the industry
yardstick for success. The ratio for mere
profitability is higher, though still daunting.
Denisoff (1986) and Burke (1996) have both
estimated that only one in ten albums would
deliver positive net results for their labels.
For those products that enjoy the above
snowballing effect, the low marginal costs of
production produce very favourable revenue/
sales quantity relationships. In 1997, for
example, the Financial Times estimated that
PolyGram’s per album profit would increase
from $2 for sales of 3 million units to $5 for
sales of 10 million. Maximising sales requires
the physical distribution of what is a low unit
value item, across disparate markets and
numerous sales outlets. Such an exercise
requires well developed logistical assets and
competencies and enjoys significant economies
of scale.
The above analysis suggests that a compe-
titive music firm needs to have marketing
competences and bargaining power to estab-
lish market awareness, sufficient financial
resources to absorb inevitable product fail-
ures and to fund promotional campaigns, and
a large output to allow it to benefit from
available scale economies in distribution and
manufacturing. The major’s superior economic
power therefore appears to complement the
independent’s knowledge based product de-
velopment resources.
The inimicality of complementary
resources
We argue that these product, firm and
market-based idiosyncrasies demonstrate that
both firm types (major and independent)
enjoy a degree of resource complementariness
(Chung, Singh & Lee, 2000) and would thus
benefit from the co-ordination of their par-
ticular assets and competencies. The paradox
in the music industry is that while value can
indeed be generated by the combination of
resources, it is the maintenance of the
boundaries between the firm types across
which the respective resources and capabili-
ties are exchanged that ensure their optimis-
ation. We go on to discuss the reasons for
such a paradox.
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Discussion
One source for the proposed inimicality is
linked to the key strategic resource of an
independent firm; its credibility. The firm and
its key individuals’ reputation among the
various music and social scenes is crucial if
the required trust is to be generated to
encourage the artist(s) to place their early
development in their hands (Hesmondhalgh,
1998). Close ties with a major can damage this
asset and thus reduce the ability of the
independent to attract the next star act. The
music industry’s highly networked social
structure acting as an efficient conduit for
such information (Burt, 1992).
The external impact of inter-organisational
relations between majors and independents
is matched by the possibility of negative in-
ternal consequences. The high levels of causal
ambiguity over successful product creation,
added to the distance between senior man-
agement and emerging music trends, restricts
the ability of the major’s hierarchically decision
making structure to make effective interven-
tions in the operation of the independent. In
this respect the independents resemble the
‘craft’ organisation introduced by Stinch-
combe (1959) and later defined by Powell
as being where ‘each product is relatively
unique, search procedures are non-routine,
and the work process depends to a consider-
able degree on intuition and experimentation’
(Powell, 1987:68). The ‘craft bureaucracy’
framework requires a different management
structure and environment to that typically
adopted by large firms, which are charac-
terised by centralised planning, hierarchies of
decision-making, and clearly defined roles
and tasks. The conventional monitoring and
supervision systems designed to manage and
control such explicit processes will be of
reduced effectiveness (Leifer & Mills, 1996)
when applied to the more ambiguous process
of popular music production and manage-
ment.
In addition to hampering the production
process of the independent, Ghoshal and
Moran (1996) propose that such attempts
can, by signalling mistrust, create mistrust
and increase the likelihood of uncollaborative
behaviour (Dyer, 1997; Wicks, Berman &
Jones, 1999). The use of hierarchy to control
assets and protect against opportunistic be-
haviour (Williamson, 1985; Das & Teng, 1996)
when applied to creative resources can there-
fore be seen as either offering limited effect-
iveness or, in the worst case scenario, counter-
productive results. The possibility of such a
negative cycle is higher where there already
exists potential for mistrust, such as in the
wide cultural distance separating the major
and independent. A ‘them and us’ perspect-
ive is part of the discourse of independent
managers such as Allan McGee, head of a
successful independent Creation, who de-
scribed staff at a major music company with
whom his company had had an alliance, as
‘nice people but not my people’.
Thus, we argue, the restricted power of fiat
to control and protect the major from un-
cooperative behaviour by the independent,
when added to the self-defeating potential of
its use, suggests that structural relations
between the two firm types be designed to
limit the independent’s exposure to the
bureaucratic processes and administrative
preferences (fiat) of the major.
The conclusion, that resources held by the
two firm types while complementary have
mutually hostile features, runs counter to a
central strategic management axiom; that
sustainable competitive advantage lies in a
firm’s control over resources which are valu-
able, rare, hard to trade and difficult to
imitate (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Teece,
Pisano & Shuen, 1997; Dussauge, Garrette &
Mitchell, 2000). The resources and capabilities
required to identify, secure and develop new
musical talent, due to their social complexity
and causal ambiguity offer strategic advan-
tage (King & Zeithaml, 2001), yet they resist
full control by the majors who themselves
control what are arguably only threshold
resources, such as capital, logistical infra-
structure support and marketing skills.
The variant to this hold and protect
imperative (Porter, 1986), the share and learn
perspective (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Barney,
1991; Mowery, Oxley & Silverman, 1996;
Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999; Khanna, Gulati
& Nohria, 1998, Teece, 2000) is also of
questionable appropriateness in the music
industry. The same idiosyncrasies that would
restrict and degrade the transfer of creative
resources in the form of people or credibility
also apply to their movement in the form of
explicit knowledge. Such knowledge is cul-
turally embedded and socially constructed
(Powell, 1987; Szulanski, 1995) and thus is
inextricably tied to particular individuals and
particular cultural environments.
It follows that sustainable competitive
advantage can only be obtained through the
development of relational competencies that
preserve the value of both the major’s but
especially the independent’s knowledge assets,
maintain the incentive levels necessary for the
independents’ entrepreneurial behaviour,
and at the same time secure the benefits of
the resulting product for both firms. The
alliance perspective that emerges is one
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where value-creating activities and even
competitive advantage are not just contained
within firm boundaries, but also reside in
the unique combination of the collaborating
firms’ assets (Chung, Singh & Lee, 2000, Holm,
Eriksson & Johanson, 1999; McConnell &
Nantell, 1985; Anand & Khana, 2000) and
the way the collaborating firms manage the
relationship (Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer, 2000;
Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000).
Viewed from this perspective, decisions
over firm boundaries in the music industry
are not made relative to the level of perceived
threat presented by collaborating with an-
other firm (Williamson, 1975, 1991), neither
from the possible appropriation of key re-
sources (Coase, 1937). Nor are they drawn in
order to acquire, through integration, the
resources identified as necessary to pursue a
particular strategy (Porter, 1986). Rather they
are drawn according to the need to protect
the competences and intangible assets of the
collaborating firm from contamination by the
organisational and cultural features of their
partner. A potentially useful metaphor sug-
gests itself here; that the boundaries between
these firms be viewed as semi-permeable
membranes that can regulate exchanges be-
tween partners. It appears critical in this case
that governance decisions are made with
regard to their anticipated impact on this
notional ‘membrane’.
Effective operation of what can be termed
this ‘composite quasi rent’ strategy (Hill,
1990:500) requires the careful patrol by both
firm types of their organisational boundaries
to ensure that mutually hostile elements of
their resources do not cross along with the
planned exchanges. For the independents
there must be competencies in protecting the
wilful artist from the source of promotional
and management resources (the major), with-
out conveying the sense that they are ‘selling
out’ or at risk of losing their independence of
spirit and decision-making. For the major,
care must be taken to ensure that monitoring
and control mechanisms typically employed
by the firm toward its operations are adjusted
in regard to the independent, and that oper-
ational collaboration (distribution, marketing
aid) does not damage the independent’s
credibility.
Conclusion
It has been proposed that the strategic
resources and capabilities held by the majors
and independents, whilst complementary,
are a feature of the typology of each firm
and resist transfer from one to the other. The
resulting paradox challenges firms to manage
their boundaries not according to their con-
cern over the possible cost of opportunistic
behaviour, in other words what a partner
might take, rather over what a partner firm
might receive through association. Competi-
tive advantage in such a scenario lies in a
firm’s ability to protect its partner(s) from
exposure to its inimical practices and hostile
features whilst at the same time benefiting
from the union of their respective resources.
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